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TAMARA FIELDS, et al.,
Plaintiffs,

Case No. 16-cv-00213-WHO
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS

v.
TWITTER, INC.,

Re: Dkt. No. 27

Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
In November 2015, Lloyd “Carl” Fields, Jr. and James Damon Creach were shot and killed

14

while working as United States government contractors at a law enforcement training center in

15

Amman, Jordan. The shooter was a Jordanian police officer who had been studying at the center.

16

In subsequent statements, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) claimed responsibility for

17

the attack, describing the gunman as a “lone wolf.” Plaintiffs, the wife of Fields and the wife and

18

children of Creach, seek to hold defendant Twitter, Inc. (“Twitter”) liable under 18 U.S.C. §

19

2333(a), part of the Anti-Terrorism Act (“ATA”), on the theory that Twitter provided material

20

support to ISIS by allowing ISIS to sign up for and use Twitter accounts, and that this material

21

support was a proximate cause of the November 2015 shooting.

22

Twitter moves to dismiss on several grounds, including that plaintiffs’ claims are barred by

23

the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). As horrific as these deaths were,

24

under the CDA Twitter cannot be treated as a publisher or speaker of ISIS’s hateful rhetoric and is

25

not liable under the facts alleged. Twitter’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED with leave to amend.

26

BACKGROUND

27

In 2015, Fields and Creach travelled to Jordan through their work as government

28

contractors. First Amended Complaint ¶¶ 71-72 (“FAC”) (Dkt. No. 21). Both had served as law
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1

enforcement officers in the United States, and both were assigned to the International Police

2

Training Center (“IPTC”), a facility in Amman run by the United States Department of State. Id.

3

¶ 73.

4

One of the men studying at the IPTC was Anwar Abu Zaid, a Jordanian police captain. Id.

5

¶ 76. On November 9, 2015, Abu Zaid smuggled an assault rifle and two handguns into the IPTC

6

and shot and killed Fields, Creach, and three other individuals. Id. ¶ 78. ISIS subsequently

7

“claimed responsibility” for the attack, describing Abu Zaid as a “lone wolf” and stating,
Do not provoke the Muslims more than this, especially recruited and
supporters of the Islamic State. The more your aggression against
the Muslims, the more our determination and revenge . . . [T]ime
will turn thousands of supporters of the caliphate on Twitter and
others to wolves.

8
9
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Id. ¶ 80.
Plaintiffs do not allege that ISIS recruited or communicated with Abu Zaid over Twitter,
that ISIS or Abu Zaid used Twitter to plan, carry out, or raise funds for the attack, or that Abu
Zaid ever viewed ISIS-related content on Twitter or even had a Twitter account. The only
arguable connection between Abu Zaid and Twitter alleged in the FAC is that Abu Zaid’s brother
told reporters that Abu Zaid had been very moved by ISIS’s execution of Jordanian pilot Maaz alKassasbeh in February 2015. Id. ¶ 84. After capturing al-Kassasbeh, ISIS launched a Twitter
campaign “to crowd source ideas for his method of execution.” Id. ISIS subsequently used a
Twitter account to distribute a 22-minute video of al-Kassasbeh’s horrific killing. Id. Plaintiffs do
not allege that Abu Zaid ever viewed the video, either on Twitter or by any other means.
Plaintiffs accuse Twitter of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), part of the ATA, by knowingly
providing material support to ISIS, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339A and 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
FAC ¶¶ 87-90 (Count 1, section 2339A), 91-94 (count 2, section 2339B). Section 2333(a)
provides:
Any national of the United States injured in his or her person,
property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism,
or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefor in any
appropriate district court of the United States and shall recover
threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of the suit,
including attorney’s fees.

28
2
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1

18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). Sections 2339A and 2339B prohibit the knowing provision of “material

2

support or resources” for terrorist activities or foreign terrorist organizations. 18 U.S.C. §§

3

2339A(a), 2339B(a)(1). The term “material support or resources” is defined to include “any

4

property, tangible or intangible, or service,” including “communications equipment.” 18 U.S.C.

5

§§ 2339A(b)(1), 2339B(g)(4).
Plaintiffs assert that Twitter’s “provision of material support to ISIS was a proximate cause

United States District Court
Northern District of California

6
7

of [their] injur[ies].” FAC ¶¶ 89, 93. They allege that Twitter “has knowingly permitted . . . ISIS

8

to use its social network as a tool for spreading extremist propaganda, raising funds and attracting

9

new recruits,” and that “[t]his material support has been instrumental to the rise of ISIS and has

10

enabled it to carry out numerous terrorist attacks, including the November 9, 2015 shooting attack

11

in Amman, Jordan in which [Fields and Creach] were killed.” Id. ¶ 1.

12

Specifically, plaintiffs contend that ISIS uses Twitter to disseminate its official media

13

publications and other content, thereby “spread[ing] propaganda and incit[ing] fear [through]

14

graphic photos and videos of its terrorist feats.” Id. ¶¶ 35-36. ISIS also uses Twitter “to raise

15

funds for its terrorist activities,” id. ¶ 30, and to “post instructional guidelines and promotional

16

videos,” id. ¶ 23.
In addition, ISIS uses Twitter as a recruitment platform, “reach[ing] potential recruits by

17
18

maintaining accounts on Twitter so that individuals across the globe can reach out to [ISIS]

19

directly.” Id. ¶ 20. “After first contact, potential recruits and ISIS recruiters often communicate

20

via Twitter’s Direct Messaging capabilities.”1 Id. Plaintiffs allege that “[t]hrough its use of

21

Twitter, ISIS has recruited more than 30,000 foreign recruits over the last year.” Id. ¶ 29.
Plaintiffs cite a number of media reports from between 2011 and 2014 concerning ISIS’s

22
23

use of Twitter and Twitter’s “refusal to take any meaningful action to stop it.” Id. ¶¶ 48-56. They

24

also describe several attempts by members of the public and United States government to persuade

25

Twitter to crack down on ISIS’s use of its services. Id. ¶¶ 57-62. They allege that, while Twitter

26

has now instituted a rule prohibiting threats of violence and the promotion of terrorism, “many

27
28

1

Twitter’s Direct Messaging capabilities allow Twitter users to communicate privately through
messages that can be seen only by the people included on them. FAC ¶ 20.
3
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1

ISIS-themed accounts are still easily found on Twitter.” Id. ¶ 70.

2
3

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain

4

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), in

5

order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,”

6

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks and alterations

7

omitted).

8
9

United States District Court
Northern District of California

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.

10

2001). “Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where the complaint lacks a cognizable

11

legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela

12

Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008). While a complaint “need not contain

13

detailed factual allegations” to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “it must plead enough facts to state

14

a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Cousins v. Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1067-68 (9th

15

Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A claim is facially plausible when it

16

“allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

17

alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).

18

In considering whether a claim satisfies this standard, the court must “accept factual

19

allegations in the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the

20

nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marines Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir.

21

2008). However, “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to

22

avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.” Cousins, 568 F.3d at 1067 (internal quotation marks omitted).

23

A court may “reject, as implausible, allegations that are too speculative to warrant further factual

24

development.” Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060, 1076 (9th Cir. 2013).

25

DISCUSSION

26

Twitter moves to dismiss on multiple grounds, but its principal argument is that plaintiffs’

27

claims are barred by section 230(c), the “protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening

28

of offensive material” provision of the CDA. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). Section 230(c) contains two
4
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1

subsections, only the first of which, section 230(c)(1), is relevant here:

2

(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker

3

No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by
another information content provider.

4
5

47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
While the Ninth Circuit has described the reach of section 230(c)(1) in broad terms, stating

6
7
8
9
10
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11
12
13
14
15
16

that it “immunizes providers of interactive computer services against liability arising from content
created by third parties,” the statute does not “create a lawless no-man’s-land on the internet.”
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162, 1164
(9th Cir. 2008); see also Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., No. 12-56638, 2016 WL 3067995, at *6 (9th
Cir. May 31, 2016) (noting that “the CDA does not declare a general immunity from liability
deriving from third-party content”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, separated into its
elements, section 230(c)(1) protects from liability only (a) a provider or user of an interactive
computer service (b) that the plaintiff seeks to treat as a publisher or speaker (c) of information
provided by another information content provider. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 110001 (9th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiffs do not dispute that Twitter is an interactive computer service provider, or that the

17
18
19
20

offending content highlighted in the FAC was provided by another information content provider.
They dispute only the second element of Twitter’s section 230(c)(1) defense, i.e., whether they
seek to treat Twitter as a publisher or speaker.
The prototypical cause of action seeking to treat an interactive computer service provider

21
22
23
24

as a publisher or speaker is defamation. See, e.g., Internet Brands, Inc., 2016 WL 3067995, at *4;
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101.2 However, “the language of the statute does not limit its application to
defamation cases.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101. Courts have applied section 230(c)(1) against a

25
26
27
28

2

Congress enacted section 230(c)(1) in part to respond to a New York state court decision,
Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995),
finding that an internet service provider could be held liable for defamation based on third-party
content posted on its message boards. See Internet Brands, 2016 WL 3067995, at *5; Barnes, 570
F.3d at 1101; Roomates, 521 F.3d at 1163.
5
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1

variety of claims, including negligent undertaking, id. at 1102-03, intentional assault, Klayman v.

2

Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357-60 (D.C. Cir. 2014), and violation of anti-sex-trafficking laws,

3

Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18-24 (1st Cir. 2016). “[W]hat matters is not

4

the name of the cause of action – defamation versus negligence versus intentional infliction of

5

emotional distress – [but] whether the cause of action inherently requires the court to treat the

6

defendant as the publisher or speaker of content provided by another.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101-

7

02 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[C]ourts must ask whether the duty that the plaintiff

8

alleges the defendant violated derives from the defendant’s status or conduct as a publisher or

9

speaker. If it does, section 230(c)(1) precludes liability.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

10

Twitter contends that plaintiffs seek to hold it liable as the publisher of content created by

11

ISIS. Mot. at 14-16 (Dkt. No. 27). It highlights the opening paragraph of the FAC – i.e., that

12

Twitter “knowingly permitted [ISIS] to use its social network as a tool for spreading extremist

13

propaganda, raising funds and attracting new recruits,” FAC ¶ 1 – and the numerous descriptions

14

in the FAC of content created and disseminated by ISIS through the Twitter platform. According

15

to Twitter, plaintiffs’ claims are based on Twitter’s alleged failure to exclude this third-party

16

content, a quintessential responsibility of a publisher. See Mot. at 14-16; see also Klayman, 753

17

F.3d at 1359 (“the very essence of publishing is making the decision whether to print or retract a

18

given piece of content”); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008) (“decisions

19

relating to the monitoring, screening, and deletion of content [are] actions quintessentially related

20

to a publisher’s role”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1170-71

21

(noting that section 230(c)(1) applies to “any activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether

22

to exclude material that third parties seek to post online,” and that “determin[ing] whether or not

23

to prevent [the] posting” of material by third parties is “precisely the kind of activity” covered by

24

the statute); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003) (“the exclusion of ‘publisher’

25

liability necessarily precludes liability for exercising the usual prerogative of publishers to choose

26

among proffered material”).

27
28

Plaintiffs make two arguments in response. First, they contend that their claims are not
based on “the contents of tweets, the issuing of tweets, or the failure to remove tweets,” but rather
6
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1

on Twitter’s “provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS in the first place.” Oppo. at 3 (Dkt. No. 31).

2

In other words, “[b]ecause the creation of a Twitter account necessarily occurs before the issuing

3

of tweets from that account, and separately from the creation of published content, [Twitter’s]

4

violations of the ATA cannot be accurately characterized as publishing activity, but rather as the

5

provision of the means through which ISIS spreads its poison.” Id. at 4. Plaintiffs further explain

6

that
[Twitter’s] liability does not arise out of its publishing conduct, but
rather its separate legal duty under the ATA not to provide terrorists
with material support . . . Indeed, plaintiffs’ claims do not require
publishing or speaking as a critical element. In no sense was
[Twitter] acting as a publisher when it permitted ISIS members to
sign up for and create these accounts. It was not reviewing, revising,
or editing content. Nor was it deciding whether content should be
publicly disseminated or withdrawn from the internet. Plaintiffs’
claims are not based on a theory that any particular tweets from ISIS
members should have been altered or restricted in any way.
Plaintiffs’ claims under the ATA are not based on offending content
at all. They are based on Twitter’s provision of material support to
ISIS, which is separate and apart from – and antecedent to – the
publication of any content. Even if ISIS had never issued a single
tweet, [Twitter’s] provision of material support to ISIS in the form
of Twitter accounts would constitute a violation of the ATA.

7
8
9
10
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11
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15

Id. at 7-8 (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted).

16

Second, plaintiffs highlight their allegations regarding Twitter’s Direct Messaging

17

capabilities and assert that “[b]ecause these private messages are not published . . . , a lawsuit

18

based on their content is not barred by the CDA.” Id. at 2. Plaintiffs assert that publishing under

19

the CDA “necessarily involves the dissemination of information to the public” and thus does not

20

encompass the transmission of private messages through Direct Messaging. Id. at 9-11.

21

I.

22

PROVISION OF ACCOUNTS THEORY
There are at least three problems with plaintiffs’ provision of accounts theory. The first is

23

that it does not align with the allegations in the FAC. Those allegations describe a theory of

24

liability based on Twitter’s knowing failure to prevent ISIS from disseminating content through

25

the Twitter platform, not its mere provision of accounts to ISIS.

26
27

To be sure, there are some allegations in the FAC concerning Twitter’s provision of
accounts to ISIS. For example, plaintiffs highlight their allegations that: (1) “[s]ince first

28
7
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1

appearing on Twitter in 2010, ISIS accounts on Twitter have grown at an astonishing rate,” FAC ¶

2

3; (2) as of December 2014, ISIS had approximately 70,000 Twitter accounts and posted at least

3

90 tweets per minute, id. ¶ 6; (3) Al-Furqan, ISIS’s official media wing, “maintained a . . . Twitter

4

page where it posted messages from ISIS leadership as well as videos and images of beheadings

5

and other brutal . . . executions to 19,000 followers,” id. ¶ 3; (4) Al-Hayat Media Center, ISIS’s

6

official public relations group, maintained “at least a half dozen Twitter accounts emphasizing the

7

recruitment of Westerners” and had nearly 20,000 followers as of June 2014, id. ¶ 4; (5) ISIS

8

“reaches potential recruits by maintaining accounts on Twitter so that individuals across the globe

9

may reach out to [it] directly,” id. ¶ 20; (6) “[e]ven when Twitter shuts down an ISIS-linked

10

account, it does nothing to stop it from springing right back up” with a different but nearly

11

identical name, id. ¶ 69; and (7) while Twitter has now instituted a rule prohibiting threats of

12

violence and the promotion of terrorism, “many ISIS-themed accounts are still easily found on

13

Twitter.com,” id. ¶ 70.

14

Plaintiffs characterize these allegations as “focus[ed] on [Twitter’s] provision of . . .

15

accounts to ISIS, not the content of the tweets.” Oppo. at 4. But with the exception of the

16

statement that “ISIS accounts on Twitter have grown at an astonishing rate,” FAC ¶ 3, all of the

17

allegations are accompanied by information regarding the ISIS-related content disseminated from

18

the accounts. Plaintiffs allege not just that ISIS had approximately 70,000 Twitter accounts, but

19

that ISIS used those accounts to post at least 90 tweets per minute, id. ¶ 6; not just that Al-Furqan

20

maintained a Twitter page, but that it maintained one “where it posted messages from ISIS

21

leadership as well as videos and images of beheadings and other brutal . . . executions to 19,000

22

followers,” id. ¶ 3; not just that Twitter failed to stop an ISIS-linked account from “springing right

23

back up,” but that an inflammatory message was tweeted from this account following the shooting

24

attack in San Bernadino, California in December 2015, id. ¶ 69.

25

The rest of the FAC is likewise riddled with detailed descriptions of ISIS-related messages,

26

images, and videos disseminated through Twitter and the harms allegedly caused by the

27

dissemination of that content. The FAC also includes a number of allegations specifically faulting

28

Twitter for failing to detect and prevent the dissemination of ISIS-related content through the
8
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1

Twitter platform. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 60 (Twitter “failed to respond to pleas to shut down clear

2

incitements to violence”), 66 (Twitter “does not actively monitor and will not censor user

3

content”). Indeed, the opening paragraph of the FAC could not be more clear about the content-

4

based theory underlying plaintiffs’ claims:

5
6

United States District Court
Northern District of California

7

Twitter has knowingly permitted . . . ISIS to use its social network
as a tool for spreading extremist propaganda, raising funds and
attracting new recruits. This material support has been instrumental
to the rise of ISIS and has enabled it to carry out numerous terrorist
attacks, including the November 9, 2015 shooting attack in Amman,
Jordan in which [Fields and Creach] were killed.

8

Id. ¶ 1 (emphasis added). In the following paragraph, plaintiffs allege that ISIS “has exploited

9

social media, most notoriously Twitter, to send its propaganda and messaging out to the world

10

and to draw in people vulnerable to radicalization,” and that ISIS has been able to use Twitter “to

11

exert an outsized impact on how the world perceives it, by disseminating images of graphic

12

violence (including the beheading of Western journalists and aid workers) . . . while using social

13

media to attract new recruits and inspire lone actor attacks.” Id. ¶ 2 (emphasis added).

14

In short, the theory of liability alleged in the FAC is not that Twitter provides material

15

support to ISIS by providing it with Twitter accounts, but that Twitter does so by “knowingly

16

permitt[ing] [ISIS] to use [those accounts] as a tool for spreading extremist propaganda, raising

17

funds, and attracting new recruits.” Id. ¶ 1. Plaintiffs do not dispute that this theory seeks to treat

18

Twitter as a publisher and is barred by section 230(c)(1). See, e.g., Oppo. at 2.

19

The second problem with plaintiffs’ provision of accounts theory is that, even if it were

20

alleged in the FAC, it would be just as barred by section 230(c)(1) as the theory plaintiffs’ actually

21

have alleged. As noted above, courts have repeatedly described publishing activity under section

22

230(c)(1) as including decisions about what third-party content may be posted online. See, e.g.,

23

Klayman, 753 F.3d at 1359 (“the very essence of publishing is making the decision whether to

24

print or retract a given piece of content”); MySpace, 528 F.3d at 420 (“decisions relating to the

25

monitoring, screening, and deletion of content [are] actions quintessentially related to a publisher’s

26

role”); Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 1170-71 (“determin[ing] whether or not to prevent [the]

27

posting” of third-party material online is “precisely the kind of activity” covered by the CDA);

28
9

United States District Court
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1

Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1031 (“the exclusion of ‘publisher’ liability necessarily precludes liability for

2

exercising the usual prerogative of publishers to choose among proffered material”). Plaintiffs’

3

provision of accounts theory is slightly different, in that it is based on Twitter’s decisions about

4

whether particular third parties may have Twitter accounts, as opposed to what particular third-

5

party content may be posted. But it is not clear to me why this difference matters for the purposes

6

of section 230(c)(1). Under either theory, the alleged wrongdoing is the decision to permit third

7

parties to post content – it is just that under plaintiffs’ provision of accounts theory, Twitter would

8

be liable for granting permission to post (through the provision of Twitter accounts) instead of for

9

allowing postings that have already occurred. Plaintiffs do not explain why this difference means

10

that the provision of accounts theory seeks to treat Twitter as something other than a publisher of

11

third-party content, and I am not convinced that it does. Despite being based on Twitter accounts

12

instead of tweets, the theory is still based on Twitter’s alleged violation of a “duty . . . derive[d]

13

from [its] status or conduct as a publisher.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102.

14

A recent First Circuit case, Jane Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.

15

2016), adds further support to this conclusion. The plaintiffs, each of whom had been a victim of

16

sex trafficking, sued the defendant website provider under the Trafficking Victims Protection

17

Reauthorization Act, asserting that the defendant had violated the statute through various “choices

18

[it] ha[d] made about the posting standards for advertisements,” including “the lack of controls on

19

the display of phone numbers, the option to anonymize email addresses, [and the] acceptance of

20

anonymous payments.” Id. at 20. The plaintiffs argued that “these choices are distinguishable

21

from publisher functions.” Id. The First Circuit disagreed, holding that section 230(c)(1) “extends

22

to the formulation of precisely the sort of website policies and practices [the plaintiffs] assail.” Id.

23

The court explained that decisions regarding the “structure and operation of [a] website” – such as

24

“permitt[ing] users to register under multiple screen names” and other decisions regarding

25

“features that are part and parcel of the overall design and operation of the website” – “reflect

26

choices about what content can appear on the website and in what form” and thus “fall within the

27

purview of traditional publisher functions.” Id. at 20-21.

28
10
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Likewise, here, Twitter’s decisions to structure and operate itself as a “platform . . .

1
2

allow[ing] for the freedom of expression [of] hundreds of millions of people around the world,”

3

FAC ¶ 65, and to allow even ISIS to “sign up for accounts on its social network,” Oppo. at 3,

4

“reflect choices about what [third-party] content can appear on [Twitter] and in what form,”

5

Backpage, 817 F.3d at 21. Where such choices form the basis of a plaintiff’s claim, section

6

230(c)(1) applies. Id.
Plaintiffs attempt to liken the provision of accounts theory to the promissory estoppel

United States District Court
Northern District of California

7
8

claim raised in Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., but the facts of that case are substantially different. The

9

plaintiff in Barnes sued Yahoo on the ground that she had relied on its promise that it would

10

remove explicit photographs her ex-boyfriend had posted online without her consent. 570 F.3d at

11

1098-99. The Ninth Circuit found that this promissory estoppel claim was not precluded by

12

section 230(c)(1) because the plaintiff did not “seek to hold Yahoo liable as a publisher or speaker

13

of third-party content, but rather as the counterparty to a contract, as a promisor who has

14

breached.” Id. at 1107. In other words, the plaintiff’s theory of liability was based not on

15

Yahoo’s “publishing conduct,” but rather on its “manifest intention to be legally obligated to do

16

something.” Id. By contrast, plaintiffs here assert no theory based on contract liability and allege

17

no promise made or breached by Twitter. Barnes does not indicate that the conduct underlying the

18

provision of accounts theory is beyond the scope of publishing conduct.
Plaintiffs also rely on Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., which the Ninth Circuit decided shortly

19
20

before oral argument in this case.3 Again, that case involves a substantially different set of facts

21

from this one. The plaintiff there sued the defendant website operator for negligent failure to

22

warn, alleging that the defendant knowingly failed to warn her that two individuals were using the

23

website to identify and lure rape victims. 2016 WL 3067995, at *2-3. Although the plaintiff had

24

posted information on the website, the two individuals had not. Id. In holding that the plaintiff

25

did not seek to hold the defendant liable as a publisher of third-party content, the Ninth Circuit

26

emphasized that her negligent failure to warn claim

27
28

3

Twitter submitted a Statement of Recent Decision regarding the opinion. Dkt. No. 34.
11
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would not require [the defendant] to remove any user content or
otherwise affect how it publishes or monitors such content . . . Any
alleged obligation to warn could have been satisfied without changes
to the content posted by the website’s users and without conducting
a detailed investigation. [The defendant] could have given a warning
to . . . users, perhaps by posting a notice on the website or by
informing users by email what it knew about the activities of [the
individuals]. Posting or emailing such a warning could be deemed
an act of publishing information, but section 230(c)(1) bars only
liability that treats a website as a publisher or speaker of content
provided by somebody else . . . A post or email warning that [the
defendant] generated would involve only content that [the
defendant] itself produced.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

United States District Court
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11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Id. at *4. Plaintiffs’ provision of accounts theory, on the other hand, has nothing to do with
information Twitter itself should have posted online. Moreover, it would significantly affect
Twitter’s monitoring and publication of third-party content by effectively requiring Twitter to
police and restrict its provision of Twitter accounts. Internet Brands, like Barnes, does not help
plaintiffs’ case.
The third problem with the provision of accounts theory is that plaintiffs have not
adequately alleged causation. Although the parties dispute the exact formulation of the
appropriate causal test for civil liability under the ATA, they agree that the statute requires a
showing of proximate causation. See Mot. at 20-23; Oppo. at 13-16; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a)
(authorizing a suit for damages by “[a]ny national of the United States injured . . . by reason of an
act of international terrorism”) (emphasis added); In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, 714
F.3d 118, 123-25 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of ATA claims for failure to
plausibly allege proximate causation); Rothstein v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 82, 94-98 (2d Cir. 2013)
(same).
Even under plaintiffs’ proposed “substantial factor” test, see Oppo. at 13, the allegations in
the FAC do not support a plausible inference of proximate causation between Twitter’s provision
of accounts to ISIS and the deaths of Fields and Creach. The only arguable connection between
Abu Zaid and Twitter identified in the FAC is that Abu Zaid’s brother told reporters that Abu Zaid
had been very moved by ISIS’s horrific execution of al-Kassasbeh, which ISIS publicized through
Twitter. See FAC ¶ 84. That connection is tenuous at best regardless of the particular theory of
liability plaintiffs decide to assert. But the connection is particularly weak under the provision of
12
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1

accounts theory because it is based on specific content disseminated through Twitter, not the mere

2

provision of Twitter accounts.
The rest of plaintiffs’ arguments and allegations with respect to proximate causation are

United States District Court
Northern District of California

3
4

similarly content-based. For example, plaintiffs assert that Twitter’s provision of material support

5

to ISIS proximately caused the deaths of Fields and Creach because Twitter has (1) “permitted

6

ISIS to use its social network ‘as a tool for spreading extremist propaganda, raising funds and

7

attracting new recruits,’” Oppo. at 15 (quoting FAC ¶ 1); (2) “g[i]ve[n] ISIS access to its Direct

8

Messaging capabilities, which [ISIS] has used for ‘covert signaling’ as well as ‘fundraising and

9

operational purposes,’” id. (quoting FAC ¶ 21); (3) allowed ISIS to use Twitter “to recruit more

10

than 30,000 foreign fighters,” id. (citing FAC ¶ 29); (4) allowed ISIS to use Twitter “to raise

11

untold sums from its supporters around the world,” id. at 15-16 (citing FAC ¶¶ 21-22, 30-34); and

12

(5) “enabled ISIS to effectuate one of the most . . . effective propaganda campaigns in history,” id.

13

at 16 (citing FAC ¶¶ 35-47). Nowhere in their opposition brief or FAC do plaintiffs explain how

14

Twitter’s mere provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS – conduct that allegedly created liability

15

before “the publication of any content” and would support liability “[e]ven if ISIS had never

16

issued a single tweet,” Oppo. at 7-8 – proximately caused the November 2015 shooting.
On the one hand, this underscores the conclusion stated above, i.e., that plaintiffs have not

17
18

actually alleged a theory based on Twitter’s mere provision of Twitter accounts to ISIS. On the

19

other hand, it highlights that, even assuming that plaintiffs have asserted such a theory, they have

20

not plausibly alleged the causal connection necessary to support it.4 Plaintiffs’ claims based on

21

the provision of accounts theory are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

22

II.

DIRECT MESSAGING THEORY

23

Plaintiffs’ other attempt to evade section 230(c)(1) is based on Twitter’s Direct Messaging

24

capabilities, which allow for the sending of private messages through the Twitter platform. Oppo.

25
26
27
28

4

While courts have not required plaintiffs bringing ATA claims based on material support
theories to “trace specific dollars to specific attacks,” Strauss v. Credit Lyonnais, S.A., 925 F.
Supp. 2d 414, 433 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); accord Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 97 F. Supp. 3d 287, 328
(E.D.N.Y. 2015) (on appeal), they have nevertheless rejected alleged causal connections that are
too speculative or attenuated to raise a plausible inference of proximate causation, Terrorist
Attacks, 714 F.3d at 123-25; Rothstein, 708 F.3d at 94-98.
13
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1

at 9-11. Plaintiffs contend that publishing activity under section 230(c)(1) “necessarily involves

2

the dissemination of information to the public” and thus does not encompass the transmission of

3

private messages through Direct Messaging. Id. In support of their Direct Messaging theory,

4

plaintiffs abandon all pretense of a content-less basis for liability and assert instead that ISIS has

5

“used [Direct Messaging] to its great advantage,” specifically, to contact and communicate with

6

potential recruits. Id. at 10; see also FAC ¶¶ 20-22.

United States District Court
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7

I am not persuaded that publishing activity under section 230(c)(1) does not extend to

8

Twitter’s Direct Messaging capabilities. As noted above, Congress enacted section 230(c)(1) in

9

part to respond to a New York state court decision finding that an internet service provider could

10

be held liable for defamation based on third-party content posted on its message boards. See, e.g.,

11

Roomates, 521 F.3d at 1163. In defamation law, the term “publication” means “communication

12

[of the defamatory matter] intentionally or by a negligent act to one other than the person

13

defamed.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1104 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Fourth Circuit has

14

held that an internet service provider covered by the “traditional definition” of publisher is

15

protected by section 230(c)(1). Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997)

16

(explaining that “every repetition of a defamatory statement is considered a publication,” and

17

“every one who takes part in the publication is charged with publication”) (internal quotation

18

marks and alterations omitted). And while the Ninth Circuit has declined to construe “the reach of

19

section 230(c)(1) [as] fastened . . . tightly to the nuances of defamation law,” the court has also

20

indicated that the statute’s protections extend at least as far as the “treat[ment] [of] internet service

21

providers as publishers . . . for the purposes of defamation.” Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1104. Under this

22

analysis, the private nature of Direct Messaging does not remove the transmission of such

23

messages from the scope of publishing activity under section 230(c)(1).

24

Neither of the two decisions cited by plaintiffs calls for a different result. In Batzel, the

25

Ninth Circuit addressed what it means for content to be “provided” by a third party, not what it

26

means to “publish” third-party content online. See 333 F.3d at 1032-35. In F.T.C. v. Accusearch,

27

Inc., No. 06-cv-00105, 2007 WL 4356786 (D. Wyo. Sept. 28, 2007), the court found that the

28

defendants were not being treated as publishers where “the only parties that had access to the
14
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1

phone records at issue were [the defendants] and the particular [customer] that [purchased them].”

2

Id. at *4. The court emphasized the “ill-gotten” nature of the phone records, and the commercial

3

nature of the defendants’ use of them. Id. It also observed that the “argument [that defendants are

4

being treated as publishers] might be more persuasive if the FTC sought to hold liable an internet

5

service provider who, by virtue of the email-hosting services [it] provide[s], merely delivered an

6

email containing ill-gotten consumer phone records.” Id. *5 (emphasis added). That, of course, is

7

essentially the situation here.

United States District Court
Northern District of California

8

Meanwhile, a number of courts have applied the CDA to bar claims predicated on a

9

defendant’s transmission of nonpublic messages, and have done so without questioning whether

10

the CDA applies in such circumstances. See Hung Tan Phan v. Lang Van Pham, 182 Cal. App.

11

4th 323, 324-28 (2010); Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 145 Cal. App. 4th 790, 795-96, 804-08

12

(2006); Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Keynetics, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 523, 528, 536-37 (D. Md. 2006).

13

Apart from the private nature of Direct Messaging, plaintiffs identify no other way in

14

which their Direct Messaging theory seeks to treat Twitter as anything other than a publisher of

15

information provided by another information content provider. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claims

16

based on this theory are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

17

CONCLUSION

18

Twitter’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall file their second amended

19
20
21
22
23

complaint, if any, within 20 days of the date of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 10, 2016
______________________________________
WILLIAM H. ORRICK
United States District Judge

24
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